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 Between Iraq and a Hard Place
 Jordanian-iraqi Relations
 Curtis Ryan
 The strange alliance between Jordan and Iraq has undergone intriguing transformations. Jordan paid a heavy
 economic price for staying out of the coalition against Iraq during the Gulf war. The strength of domestic pro-
 Iraqi feeling led Jordan's regime to ask itself: was it possible notto support Saddam? Now, despite dealigning
 from Iraq in the mid-1990s, Jordan may still be the closest friend Saddam Hussein's regime is likely to find in
 the region.
 he Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered the most
 comprehensive regional realignment since the Sadat
 peace initiative of 1977. Most Arab states, includ-
 ing Egypt, Syria and all the states of the Gulf Coopera-
 tion Council (GCC), opposed Iraq and joined the US-led
 coalition. But noticeably absent from that coalition was
 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which stood firm as
 one of the few states not to realign. The Jordanians re-
 mained out of the war, urging a peaceful solution. To
 the displeasure of the United States and its allies, Jordan
 remained Iraq's closest ally, and the kingdom paid a heavy
 economic price for its decision. Ten years later, the
 strange alliance between the conservative Jordanian mon-
 archy and the "revolutionary" Ba'thist regime-whose
 forebears had overthrown another Hashemite monarch
 in 1958-has undergone intriguing transformations.
 What explains Jordan's unwillingness to join the Desert
 Storm coalition? And only six years after King Hussein's
 treaty with Israel, what accounts for the current thaw in
 Iraqi-Jordanian relations?
 Former Relatives, Economic Allies
 Almost twenty years of Jordanian-Iraqi hostility followed
 the bloody military coup of 1958, which removed King
 Hussein's uncle Faysal from the Iraqi throne. King Hussein,
 Curtis Ryan teaches political science and international affairs at Mary Washington
 College in Fredericksburg, Va.
 who had thwarted a coup attempt against his own regime in
 1957, naturally loathed the successive Iraqi republican gov-
 ernments as the murderers of his uncle.1 Immediately prior
 to the coup, the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan
 had been united in the short-lived Arab Federation
 (February 14-July 14, 1958).
 Given this history, observers were surprised when Jordan and
 Iraq began to develop closer ties by the late 1970s.2 Both eco-
 nomic and political pressures pushed Jordan to shift its pri-
 mary regional alliance from Syria-a major trading partner and
 a crucial frontline ally in conflict with Israel-toward Iraq. Iraq
 wooed Jordan with the kind of substantial economic support
 that Syria could not hope to match. In the realm of regional
 politics, Syria pushed for a hardline stance against the Egyptian
 peace initiative, while Jordan opted for a less confrontational
 approach, hoping to lure Egypt back into the Arab fold.3 The
 1978 Baghdad Summit of the League of Arab States marked
 the beginning of the new Jordanian-Iraqi alliance.
 Jordan backed Iraq unequivocally in the Iran-Iraq war,
 decisively breaking its earlier alignment with Syria, which
 backed Iran. Eight years of war reinforced the Jordanian-
 Iraqi alignment. Jordan became Iraq's main supply corri-
 dor as well as its main outlet for oil exports, given the
 closure of the Syrian pipeline and the difficulty of trans-
 porting oil out of the Persian Gulf. In the diplomatic arena,
 both actively rallied the oil states to make good on their
 aid commitments to Jordan and Iraq, in their capacity as
 the frontline states in two different Arab conflicts: Jordan
 with Israel, and Iraq with Iran. For the Hashemite regime,
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 perennially frightened of anti-royalist unrest, the necessity
 of checking Iran's "revolutionary threat" outweighed the
 domestic risks of attacking the new Islamic republic.
 King Hussein's official condemnations of Iran and decla-
 ration of unequivocal support for Iraq met surprise and con-
 sternation in the Jordanian street. But the regime quickly
 embarked on a campaign to sell the unpopular alignment to
 Jordanian public opinion. Eventually, booming business
 opportunities linked to Iraq, and a seemingly endless set of
 Iraqi grants for groups like the Jordan Press Federation,
 swayed more and more Jordanians to support Saddam
 Hussein's regime.4
 The economic benefits of alignment with Iraq also in-
 cluded a boom in Jordan's port of'Aqaba as well as its over-
 land transportation sector, as the kingdom became Iraq's
 main economic link to the outside world during the war
 with Iran. By 1989, Jordan received 17.3 percent of its
 imports from Iraq, and sent Iraq 23.2 percent of its ex-
 ports.5 Most of Jordan's oil supply came from Iraq at no
 charge-the price of shipments was deducted from Iraq's
 large wartime debt to the Kingdom. Jordanian-Iraqi eco-
 nomic ties had become so deep by the time of the 1990
 crisis that some regarded the relationship as a "de facto
 federation."6 These economic ties would constrain the
 monarchy during the second Gulf war.
 Weathering Desert Storm
 When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Jordan declined to join the
 US-led coalition. But the Kingdom also called for Iraqi
 withdrawal, maintained its recognition of the al-Sabah gov-
 ernment of Kuwait and rejected the Iraqi claim of annex-
 ation. Many individual Jordanians volunteered to defend
 Iraq, but the Jordanian armed forces remained strictly neu-
 tral and did not fight alongside the Iraqi army. Critics saw
 Jordan's fence-straddling position in 1990 as pro-Iraq. In
 Western capitals, the predominant hawks argued that Jor-
 dan had allied itself with Saddam Hussein and against its
 long-standing friends in the West and against pro-West-
 ern regimes in the Arab world. Those more sympathetic to
 Jordan viewed its position as the definition of a balanced
 stance. But all sides recognized that Jordan's position be-
 spoke its extreme vulnerability both domestically and re-
 gionally, and that no choice was without heavy costs.
 Jordan's position during the second Gulf war was deeply
 rooted in economic problems and domestic politics-in-
 cluding its nascent "democratization" program. Following
 waves of riots triggered by IMF austerity measures in 1989,
 the Hashemite regime had initiated a program of political
 liberalization.7 This included loosening restrictions on the
 press and allowing for parliamentary elections in which op-
 position Islamist candidates fared very well. Both the parlia-
 ment and the Jordanian public adopted far clearer and
 unequivocal pro-Iraq positions than the monarchy during
 the Gulf crisis. Numerous street demonstrations, speeches
 on the floor of the parliament and articles in newly estab-
 lished newspapers and magazines all indicated a popular
 outpouring of enthusiasm for Saddam Hussein. In light of
 the strength of domestic feeling, the regime had to ask it-
 self: was it possible not to support Saddam?
 The regime's cautious stance kept King Hussein's domestic
 popularity intact, but Jordan suffered severe economic reper-
 cussions. Aid from the United States, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
 was abruptly halted. Exports to and from most Arab coun-
 tries also declined rapidly. The port of Aqaba was eventually
 all but shut off to commercial traffic, leading to a sharp de-
 cline in port revenues as well as in goods entering the country.
 Jordan's much-needed tourism income effectively evaporated.
 Finally, angry Gulf states-first Saudi Arabia and then liber-
 ated Kuwait-expelled several hundred thousand Jordanians
 and Palestinians working in their countries.
 Jordan's Dealignment from Iraq
 Global crisis and regional war did not persuade the king-
 dom to budge from its Iraqi alignment, yet less than four
 years after Desert Storm Jordan had signed a full peace treaty
 with Israel. Following the signing of the treaty, the Jorda-
 nian government grew steadily more critical of Saddam
 Hussein's regime. By January 1996, the government allowed
 Iraqi opposition groups to open offices in Amman. King
 Hussein and Jordanian officials met with Iraqi opposition
 leaders in London in early 1996, and the king met person-
 ally with Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of
 Kurdistan (PUK), and Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish
 D mocratic Party (KDP).
 The kingdom also granted political asylum to Iraq's high-
 est-ranking defectors ever, including daughters and sons-in-
 law of Saddam Hussein. Some of these defectors, like the
 Kamil brothers, shocked Jordan by returning to Baghdad,
 where they met a grisly end. But less than a month later,
 Jordan granted asylum to another high-level defector, Gen-
 eral Nazar Khazraji, who had served as chief of staff for the
 Iraqi army in the late 1980s.8
 In 1997, Jordan reinforced its new international align-
 ments and further distanced itself from Iraq, becoming the
only Arab country to send observers to joint US-Israeli-Turk-
 ish naval exercises. President Clinton praised Jordan's new
 anti-Iraqi stance and announced that US fighter squadrons
 would be deployed in Jordan to monitor the "no-fly zone"
 in southern Iraq.9 Jordan developed closer bilateral ties with
 each of the three states in the US-Israeli-Turkish strategic
 alliance. In addition to the 1994 treaty with Israel, the Ameri-
 can government declared in November 1996 that Jordan
 would henceforth be regarded as a "non-NATO ally," an
 unusual status in effect granting Jordan "priority consider-
 ation" for future arms and military aid requests.10 The king-
 dom further extended its bilateral military ties with Turkey,
 while vociferously denying that military cooperation with
 Turkey amounted to a Jordanian-Turkish alliance. In 1999,
 Jordanian troops participated in Egyptian-NATO military
 exercises in the western desert of Egypt.1 In the last two
 years, Jordan also has gained admittance to the World Trade
 O ganization and achieved "association status" with the
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 European Free Trade Association. In sum, Jordan's external
 realignment in the "New World Order" seemed to be com-
 plete and that, in turn, seemed to spell the end of good rela-
 tions with Iraq.
 Allies or Adversaries?
 Yet it would be inaccurate to describe Jordanian-Iraqi re-
 lations today as uniformly adversarial. Despite the ever-
 deepening political, military and economic linkages
 between Jordan and major Western countries and insti-
 tutions, the West accuses
 Jordan of not respecting Less than fur yea
 the UN embargo on
 Iraq-a charge not with- Jordan had signed a
 out merit. The evidence ae. Fg
 here is mixed, yet the Jor-
 danian-Iraqi border ap- the Jordanian gove
 pears to be the most
 porous in the international more critical ofSad
 blockade of Iraq. Jordan
 has been Iraq's main legal trading partner under the ex-
 ceptions written into the UN Security Council resolu-
 tions that created the embargo, but the fact remains that
 Jordan (like Turkey and Iran) also conducts much illegal
 trade with Iraq. Illegal trade may not, however, be ap-
 proved by the regime in Amman: Jordanian border agents
 impounded parts of Russian manufactured missile guid-
 ance systems that were being smuggled into Iraq in 1995
 and, as noted above, US planes have monitored Iraq from
 Jordanian bases.12
 Individual and private acts of smuggling, like the al-
 leged use of'Aqaba's port as a transit point for Lebanese
 consumer goods en route to Iraq, or the use of Jordanian
 front companies to import to Iraq military-use electronic
 equipment from Malaysia and Singapore, seem to domi-
 nate illegal trade.13 Though the overwhelming majority
 of the Iraqi community in Jordan are dissident exiles (in-
 cluding many artists), at least some Iraqi exiles appear to
 be running private firms that may be little more than
 fronts for Iraqi government interests.14 Smuggling isn't
 sanctioned by Amman, but one can't mistake the hostil-
 ity of the Jordanian street and the government to the sanc-
 tions regime.
 The riots of 1998, for example, were rooted in unease
 over numerous issues-such as peace with Israel and IMF
 austerity measures-but they also included explicit dem-
 onstrations against the sanctions and against the Jorda-
 nian government's complicity in enforcing them. A
 genuine concern for the suffering of the Iraqi people per-
 vades Jordanian public opinion. At the same time, the
 Gulf war did not eradicate the business connections that
 Jordanians and Iraqis had built over more than 20 years.
 Many Jordanians believe strongly that the sanctions re-
 gime has not only hurt Iraqis, but that it is responsible
 for Jordan's current economic recession. The general sym-




 is rendered more explicit in Jordan's civil society: most
 of Jordan's political parties and most of Jordan's strong
 and vocal professional associations are on record con-
 demning the sanctions and calling for their removal.
 At least officially, this view extends to the very peak of
 the political system. When King Abdallah II ascended
 the throne in 1999, he softened Jordanian rhetoric to-
 ward Iraq and called-in his first speech before parlia-
 ment-for lifting the economic blolckade. When the
 Pan-Arab Games were held in Amman in 1999, Jordan
 ensured that Iraq would participate for the first time since
 1985 (prompting a Ku-
 afier Desert Storm waiti boycott).'5 In more
 substantial terms, in
 ull peace treaty with January 2000 Jordan and
 signing othe te Iraq renewed their oil
 e and trade protocols, al-
 nment grew steadily lowing Jordan to import
 an average of 80,000 bar-
 am Husseins regime. rels of oil per day from
 Iraq, half of that for free,
 and th  other half at a price well below market value.16
 Th  rift of the mid-1990s has been replaced with a re-
 turn to strong economic linkages of benefit to both re-
 gimes. Jordan may no longer be the full ally of Saddam
 Huss in, but it may be the closest friend his regime is
 lik ly to find in the region. U
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